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Agenda item 64
MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY - PREVENTION OF
THE VIOLENT DISINTEGRATION
OF STATES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Fifty-fourth year

Letter dated 30 March 1999 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to attach the text of a statement by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation in connection with the aggression by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly under agenda item 64 and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Sergey V. LAVROV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

99-09017 (E) 300399 300399

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Annex

Statement dated 27 March 1999 by the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation in connection with the aggression by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

On 24 March 1999, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), having commenced rocket and bomb attacks, unleashed a war against a sovereign State - the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Since the attempt by Yugoslavia to counteract armed aggressive separatism in its own territory was the reason for the bombardment, it is undeniable that the use of force by NATO is an act of aggression that blatantly violates the Charter of the United Nations and generally recognized principles and norms of international law. That day has become a dark day in the history of Europe: through the fault of NATO, the continent is on the verge of the most serious military and political crisis in recent decades. The threat of a large-scale military conflict in the Balkans, into which many States will be drawn, is becoming more real with each passing day.

The military operations against Yugoslavia, which were undertaken by the North Atlantic Alliance without approval by the Security Council, are destroying the entire system of international security based on the authority of the United Nations, discrediting the role of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and clearly demonstrating that the rocket and bomb diplomacy of NATO, inspired by the United States of America, represents a real threat to peace and stability in Europe and throughout the world.

In spite of the hypocritical statements by NATO leaders, it is obvious that the armed assault against Yugoslavia will not avert, but will only worsen the humanitarian catastrophe in south-eastern Europe and cause the deaths of civilians and enormous destruction. This madness must be halted immediately.

The State Duma of the Russian Federation Federal Assembly strongly condemns the aggression by NATO and expresses its solidarity with the peoples of fraternal Yugoslavia. In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has the right of individual or collective self-defence. Accordingly, it is entitled to defend itself against aggression by all available means.

The armed attack against Yugoslavia was carried out in spite of firm opposition by the Russian Federation and the obligations undertaken by NATO member States and laid down in OSCE instruments and the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The State Duma declares that it considers the aggression against a friendly State - the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - a serious threat to the security of the Russian Federation. There are no guarantees that other States will not be the next target of State terrorism on the part of NATO. There are more than enough pretexts for aggression in the current situation that can be thought up.

The most serious lessons should be learned from the events concerning Yugoslavia. The State Duma is confident that the peoples of the Russian Federation will find the strength to bring about the rebirth of the Russian State, which will be able to rebuff all forms of aggression and diktat and ensure, in close cooperation with other countries, stable peace and reliable security on the basis of the generally recognized principles and forms of international law.

The State Duma firmly demands the immediate halting of the military strikes against Yugoslavia and the acts of violence in Kosovo and Metohija and insists on the resumption without delay of political negotiations in order to find ways to resolve the conflict through exclusively peaceful means on the basis of the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia as well as full observance of international legal norms with regard to the protection of human rights and the rights of national minorities. The State Duma appeals to the Parliaments of the States of the world, including the Parliaments of the member States of NATO, calling upon them to advocate the immediate halting of the bombardment of Yugoslavia, prevent a further increase in the number of victims, and bring about a return to the use of civilized political means for settling the crisis in the Balkans.

In light of the situation resulting from NATO aggression, the State Duma also deems it necessary for all the State government bodies of the Russian Federation to draw up a series of measures aimed at enhancing the defence capability of the Russian Federation, expanding international cooperation with friendly countries and reviewing relations with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

The State Duma supports the decisions taken by the President of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian Federation, under which all official relations between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have been suspended until the cessation of the military operations conducted by NATO against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the main military representative of the Russian Federation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been recalled, participation by the Russian Federation in the Partnership for Peace programme and the operation of NATO information centres in the territory of the Russian Federation have been suspended, and the Russian contingent in the stabilization force in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been removed from subordination to the NATO military command.

The State Duma recommends that the President of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian Federation should take the following measures:

1. Taking into account the situation resulting from the war unleashed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization against a sovereign State - the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - to make the necessary additions to the national security concept of the Russian Federation and speed up the formulation and adoption of the Russian Federation's military doctrine;

2. To put forward, on behalf of the Russian Federation, a broad-based peace initiative aimed at immediately halting the rocket and bomb attacks

against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and resuming the political negotiations to settle the crisis;

3. To consider the question of the advisability of the maintenance in force for the Russian Federation of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in view of the blatant violation by NATO of the provisions of that document, and to recall temporarily the permanent representative of the Russian Federation to NATO;

4. To demand the holding of a special session of the General Assembly to consider the question of aggression against a State Member of the United Nations and the blatant violation of the Charter of the United Nations by the member States of NATO;

5. To take the position that the unilateral actions by the member States of NATO in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and in circumvention of the Security Council constitute a rejection of Security Council resolutions, including resolution 1160 (1998) and 1199 (1998), which provide, inter alia, for the introduction of sanctions against Yugoslavia;

6. To raise the question of the conducting by the International Criminal Tribunal on the Former Yugoslavia of an investigation into crimes linked to the NATO aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;

7 To consider the question of providing the necessary assistance to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter;

8. To propose the urgent holding of consultations with the heads of State who did not support NATO aggression against Yugoslavia in order to coordinate political and diplomatic measures aimed at halting the war in the Balkans;

9. To address a message to the non-aligned movement and regional international organizations in connection with the start of the war in the Balkans;

10. To take measures to increase the combat readiness of the armed forces of the Russian Federation and draw up clear plans for mobilization and operations;

11. To take measures to provide humanitarian assistance to the peoples of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, render assistance to the refugees and victims of the war, and respect the desire of citizens of the Russian Federation to give voluntarily humanitarian and other assistance to the peoples of fraternal Yugoslavia;

12. To step up work on bringing about the return of the funds illegally taken out of the Russian Federation and to allocate them to support national industry, first of all, the branches that ensure the defence capability and security of the Russian Federation;

13. To speed up the process of unifying the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus; and take measures to bring about closer integration of the member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States;

14. To step up consultations with interested member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States on enhancing the effectiveness of the system of collective security in light of the events in the Balkans;

15. To withdraw temporarily the draft federal law submitted to the State Duma on the ratification of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the START-II Treaty);

16. To adjust, taking into account the military operations undertaken by NATO in the Balkans, the position concerning international treaties affecting the defence capability and security of the Russian Federation.

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LETTER DATED 29 MARCH 1999 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I am enclosing herewith the text of the appeal of the Federal Ministry for Development, Science and the Environment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for the cessation of aggression against my country. I would be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vladislav JOVANOVIC
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

99-09023 (E) 300399

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Annex

Appeal to the world public

We appeal to all international organizations and institutions, Governments of States, relevant political factors and the entire world public to stop urgently the senseless act of war aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) threatens the life and health of our people and endangers the entire environment.

Destruction of protected natural and cultural assets, in particular those on the United Nations list of protected assets of international significance, of chemical and industrial plants, is an example of disastrous actions against the environment never seen before. Dangerous and radioactive waste depots and facilities, the destruction of which results in industrial disasters with transboundary effects, have become special targets.

Continuation of these destructive actions and war aggression may reach catastrophic proportions with unforeseeable consequences for the environment of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the broader region of south-eastern Europe.

The NATO aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has threatened man as a living being, his inviolable rights to life and health, the environment as the basis of the overall material and social development.

This senseless behaviour is directly opposed to numerous international documents (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Charter of the United Nations, documents of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and international agreements in the field of the environment) which exclude the possibility of war destruction, discrimination and isolation of any State or nation.

Threat to human life and health, to natural and cultural values and to material assets is the worst form of depredation of the environment. NATO's senseless, aggressive and genocidal actions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, contrary to all norms of international law, cause economic, social and ecological damage to our country.

We call for an urgent cessation of the act of aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia never seen before.

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LETTER DATED 30 MARCH 1999 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to convey the attached self-explanatory letter, dated 27 March 1999, which I have received over the weekend from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (see annex).

I should appreciate your bringing the present communication from the Secretary-General of NATO to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kofi A. ANNAN

99-09053 (E) 300399

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Annex

Letter dated 27 March 1999 from the Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to the Secretary-General of the United Nations

I am writing to update you on developments concerning ongoing North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operations in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

During the last few days, an increasing number of reports indicate that security forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have taken advantage of the absence of international observers and media to commit serious human rights abuses and atrocities against the civilian population, and to plunder and destroy civilian infrastructure and dwellings. This has exacerbated the flow of refugees and internally displaced persons, increased human suffering and led to heightened tension and instability in the region.

As a result, I have directed the NATO Supreme Allied Command Europe (SACEUR) to initiate a broader scope of operations to intensify action against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia forces and compel them to desist from further attacks in Kosovo and to meet the demands of the international community.

As I have repeatedly made clear, NATO military actions are intended to support the political aims of the international community. All Allies stand united in this action and in our determination to bring a halt to violence in Kosovo and to prevent further humanitarian catastrophe.

I will continue to keep you informed of significant developments.

(Signed) Javier SOLANA

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PROGRESS REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON STANDBY ARRANGEMENTS FOR PEACEKEEPING

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted in pursuance of the Security Council's request for a report, at least once a year, on the progress made on standby arrangements with Member States concerning their possible contribution to United Nations peacekeeping operations (S/PRST/1994/22). It covers developments since the submission of my previous report on the subject on 24 December 1997 (S/1997/1009).

II. CONCEPT

2. The concept of standby arrangements for peacekeeping operations remains as described in detail in previous reports. Its purpose is to have a precise understanding of the forces and other capabilities a Member State will have available, at a given state of readiness, should it agree to contribute to a peacekeeping operation. Such resources may include military units, individual civilian and military specialists, specialized services, equipment and other capabilities. The key element in the system of standby arrangements is the bilateral exchange of detailed information to facilitate planning and preparation for both the participating Member States and the United Nations. The information provided to the Secretariat is stored in a confidential database.

III. CURRENT STATUS

3. As previously reported, 67 Member States had indicated, as of 1 December 1997, their willingness to provide resources to the standby arrangements system, totalling some 88,000 personnel that could, in principle, be called upon. As at the date of the present report, 81 Member States, 14 more than reported last year, have made such pledges, raising the total to some 104,000 personnel that Member States would consider making available for a peacekeeping operation.

4. The 81 participating Member States are:

Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chad, China, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mongolia, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Of these Member States, Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Gambia, Latvia, Madagascar, Mali, Mongolia, Namibia, Niger, Thailand and Togo have joined the standby arrangements system since my last report.

5. A total of 61 out of these 81 Member States have now provided information on the specific capabilities they are prepared to offer.

6. Since my last report, the following eight Member States have formalized their standby contributions through the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on standby arrangements with the United Nations: Finland, Germany, Ireland, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Nigeria, the Netherlands and Romania. This brings the total number of Member States who have signed a Memorandum of Understanding to 21.

7. The capabilities involved are shown in table 1 of the annex to the present report. The total of some 104,000 personnel includes both grouped personnel and individuals, with contributions varying in size and capability from infantry battalions to medical specialists and election monitors: they cover the whole range of components envisaged from multifunctional peacekeeping operations. As the bulk of resources, however, consists of infantry, there continues to be a need for additional resources to complement manoeuvre units with the necessary logistic support. This is especially so in the areas of: strategic sealift/airlift; communications; multi-role logistics; transport; health services; engineering; mine-clearing; and transport utility aircraft, the so-called force multipliers for a peacekeeping operation. The functions within each category of resources are shown in table 2 of the annex. In this regard, the Secretariat is continuing to encourage Member States that have such assets to include them in their pledges. While such additional resources have been pledged in the past year, there remains a need to include more civilian police personnel in the system. Member States are encouraged to add police resources to their contributions.

8. The resources outlined above are grouped, according to their response time, as shown in figure 1 of the annex. Some 43 per cent of the confirmed standby resources have a response time for deployment, from their normal locations, of 30 days or less; 16 per cent have the response time between 30 and 60 days;

5 per cent have a response time between 60 and 90 days; the remaining 36 per cent have a response time of more than 90 days or have not stated any response time. The Member States that have resources in the last group, without a stated response time, are strongly encouraged to determine a realistic response time for their resources.

9. Much still remains to be done, both to widen the involvement of Member States in the standby arrangements system and to improve the availability and utilization of the resources pledged by them.

10. The standby arrangements system was also promoted during the African peacekeeping training strategy seminar, held on 26 May 1998, and during the visit of a standby arrangements briefing team to six southern African Member States in June 1998. Finally, special attention has also been paid to the need to brief the permanent missions of African Member States. This work has paid off; since the last progress report, 10 African Member States have joined the system, bringing the total number of African countries in the standby arrangements system to 22. The Secretariat is now looking into the feasibility of dispatching a standby arrangements briefing team to the West Africa region during the first part of the year.

IV. INFORMATION, PLANNING AND CONTINGENT-OWNED EQUIPMENT

11. The General Assembly, by its resolution 50/222 of 11 April 1996, authorized the implementation of a new procedure for determining reimbursement to Member States for contingent-owned equipment. This procedure requires a Memorandum of Understanding on contributions to be agreed and signed before the actual deployment of the contingent or resources to the mission area can be carried out. Such a requirement, as well as the time required for the procurement and contracting of necessary transportation to move the resources to the mission area, could delay the process of rapid deployment. Member States that have already pledged to the standby arrangements system may wish to exchange, in advance, the data required to complete annexes A, B and C to the COE Memorandum of Understanding on contingent-owned equipment (A/51/967). This can be done within the framework of the standby arrangements system. The data in the Memorandum of Understanding can be used in the early stages of the support planning process; it can then be adjusted during the finalization of the Memorandum of Understanding, when a Member State eventually confirms its readiness to participate in a specific operation. This should streamline the process significantly.

12. A new form, the Planning Data Sheet, was introduced in order to facilitate the preparation of a preliminary Memorandum of Understanding on contributions. This form requires information on capabilities, organization, movement data, details of self-sufficiency and a list of major equipment for the units, in accordance with the Manual on Policies and Procedures concerning Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-owned Equipment of Troop-Contributing Countries Participating in Peacekeeping Missions. The implementation of the Planning Data Sheet has resulted in a simplification of the Memorandum of Understanding on standby arrangements, which now includes an annex, a summary of contributions covering a description of the resources and their response times. This has, in

turn, facilitated the process of signing a Memorandum of Understanding on standby arrangements between the United Nations and the Government concerned. It is expected that Member States providing resources with a response time of up to 60 days will complete the Planning Data Sheet.

13. Owing to the problems that have surfaced as a result of the reduced manning of the standby arrangements teams (down from six officers and one non-commissioned officer, in December 1997, to two officers at present); it is not currently possible to realize the whole potential of the standby arrangements system. We should expand the database by incorporating the additional detailed information from the new Planning Data Sheet in order to accelerate the process of planning and deployment of units. This should make it easier for units to arrive in mission areas fully equipped and with sufficient provisions to sustain themselves for a period of up to 60 days.

14. The information contained in the Planning Data Sheet may also help in addressing the problem of units being offered that lack the full range of equipment needed for participation in a peacekeeping operation. In this regard, taking into account the very limited capacity of the Secretariat to maintain such equipment, the idea of partnerships needs to be encouraged once again. Such agreements between Governments that can offer manpower but need equipment and those ready to provide it should cover and include related aspects (such as training and maintenance); they could then be made a part of a standby arrangement upon participation in the system. The new procedure for determining reimbursement for contingent-owned equipment allows Member States to take the lead in providing support to contingents from another country whose support is subject to reimbursement by the United Nations under pre-established conditions and rates.

15. It should be pointed out that the standby arrangements information registered in the database has proved most helpful in the planning for and subsequent deployment to peacekeeping operations in Haiti, Angola, Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium), Guatemala, the Central African Republic, Western Sahara, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force), Sierra Leone and Georgia. The data has been used extensively by departmental planning officers and has contributed to better planning and reduced deployment times.

V. RESPONSE TIME

16. Because response time is a key element in the achievement of rapid deployment, special efforts have been made to urge Member States to reconsider the response time for their pledged resources. At the same time, those who have not communicated any response time have been asked to determine one. The goal is to get a better balance of resources into the bracket of a response time of 0-60 days. Response time is defined as the time that elapses between the moment a formal request from the Secretary-General to provide resources is received by the Permanent Representative of the Member State concerned and the moment when the resources are ready to be picked up at specified points of embarkation for deployment to the mission area. It thus includes the time required by

Governments for domestic political approval and administrative procedures as well as for military, police or individual preparation.

VI. OBSERVATIONS

17. the system of standby arrangements has confirmed its ability to expedite planning by early identification of possible troop-contributors and providing timely, accurate and reliable information to those who have to plan for deployment of troops and equipment. The system has also begun to demonstrate its usefulness as a tool to shorten the time required for the finalization of the Memorandum of Understanding for the provision of personnel, equipment and services in support of peacekeeping operations. This is achieved by providing the possibility of exchanging the necessary information in advance, using the Planning Data Sheet. Work in this area will proceed as manpower resources allow.

18. The Secretariat has also continued to explore suitable arrangements for the establishment of Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters. Notwithstanding recent budgetary decisions that have only allowed for insufficient manning, the Secretariat is convinced of the value that such a headquarters could play in ensuring a quick and effective response to emerging crises.

19. While the Organization still does not have true rapid-reaction capability, standby arrangements have been a step forward. In this regard, I once again welcome the efforts by Member States to increase the readiness of resources pledged for peacekeeping duties.

20. I also wish to invite all Member States to continue to join the system, regardless of the size of the contribution they can make. The overall goal is to achieve wider participation in the standby arrangements. I will also continue to encourage Member States to provide more civilian police personnel and support capacities, mostly in the areas of strategic sealift/airlift, communications, multi-role logistics, health services, engineering, mine-clearance, road transport and transport utility aircraft. This should contribute to the enhancement of the system that has been and will continue to be used for the planning of peacekeeping operations and also help ensure a balanced geographical distribution among the participants in future peacekeeping operations.

ANNEX

Statistical information on standby arrangements for peacekeeping

Table 1 - Manpower by category and response time

Category of	0-30 days		31-60 days		61-90 days		90 + days		
Units	Available	Deployed	Available	Deployed	Available	Deployed	Available	Deployed	Total
Operational	24120	5658	6927	2140	4300	680	12259	2059	58143
Support	10234	1162	7136	194	270	0	22408	592	41996
Others	2483	714	227	88	0	0	489	162	4163
Total	36837	7534	14290	2422	4570	680	35156	2813	104302

Table 2 - Categories broken down by functions

Operational	Support	Others
Air Defence	Air Services	Civilian Police
Artillery	Communications	Civilian & Medical Specialists
Infantry	Engineer Support	Medical Personnel (units)
Navy	Food and Catering	Military Observers
	HQ Support	Staff Officers
	Health Services	Others
	Logistics	No list of capabilities
	Maintenance	
	Movement control	
	Navy Auxiliary	
	Supply	
	Transportation, ground	

Figure 1 - Manpower Readiness Breakdown